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Summary
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide first assumed office in February 1991,
following elections that were widely heralded as the first free and fair elections in
Haiti’s then-186-year history.  He was overthrown by a military coup in September
1991.  For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands that
Aristide be restored to office.  U.S. policy under the Administrations of Presidents
George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton consisted of pressuring the de facto
Haitian military regime to restore constitutional democracy. Measures included
cutting off aid to the government; imposing trade embargoes; supporting OAS and
U.N. diplomatic efforts, and ultimately, a military intervention to remove the regime.
In September 1994, after a U.S. military intervention had been launched, the
military regime agreed to Aristide’s return, the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S.
troops, and the resignation of its leadership.  President Aristide returned to Haiti in
October 1994, under the protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops.  Aristide disbanded
the army and, with U.S. assistance, began to train a professional, civilian police force.
Elections held under Aristide and his successor, Rene Preval (1996-2000), including
the one in which Aristide was reelected in 2000, were marred by alleged
irregularities, low voter turnout, and opposition boycotts.  Efforts to negotiate a
resolution to the electoral dispute frustrated the international community for years.
Tension and violence in Haiti continued throughout Aristide’s second term,
culminating in his departure from office in February 2004, after the opposition
repeatedly refused to negotiate a political solution and armed groups took control of
over half the country.  Aristide claims that he is still the elected president and that the
United States forced him from office, a charge the Bush Administration denies.
An interim government, backed by the Bush Administration, was established
with Gerard LaTortue as Prime Minister.  The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti has
improved security conditions, but Haiti, the poorest nation in the Western
Hemisphere, remains unstable. Natural disasters have contributed to instability.
Debate over whether security conditions and technical problems will be sufficiently
resolved to allow free, fair, and safe elections have led to several postponements.
Presidential elections are now set for January 8 and runoff elections for February 15.
Congressional concerns regarding Haiti include fostering stability and
democratic development, the cost and effectiveness of U.S. assistance, protection of
human rights, improvement of security conditions, combating narcotics trafficking,
addressing Haitian migration, and alleviating poverty.  Current law related to Haiti
includes P.L. 109-13, P.L. 108-25, P.L. 108-324, and P.L. 108-447.  Legislation
includes H.R. 257, H.R. 611, H.R. 899, H.R. 945, H.R. 946, H.R. 1130, H.R. 1213/S.
704, H.R. 1409, H.R. 1737, H.R. 2092, H.R. 2592, H.R. 2601, H.R. 3057, H.R. 3658,
H.R. 3700, H.R. 4211/S. 1937, S. 350, S. 453, S. 600, S. 1197.  This report will be
updated periodically.  See also CRS Report RL33156, Haiti: International Assistance
Strategy for the Interim Government and Congressional Concerns; and “Haiti” in
CRS Report RL32733, Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues for the U.S.
Congress.
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1 Sources for historical background  include CRS Report 95-602, Haiti:  Efforts to Restore
President Aristide, 1991-1994; and CRS Report 93-931, Haiti:  Background to the 1991
Overthrow of President Aristide, both by Maureen Taft-Morales.
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Stance Against Armed Gangs,” Associated Press, Nov. 27, 2005.
Haiti:  Developments and U.S. Policy Since
1991 and Current Congressional Concerns
Developments and U.S. Policy Since 19911
Most Recent Developments
Nationwide elections, originally scheduled for fall 2005, have been postponed
several times in the face of debate over whether security conditions, political issues,
and technical problems were sufficiently resolved to allow free, fair, and safe
elections.  On November 26, the Provisional Electoral Council announced a new set
of dates.  Presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 8, 2006,
second round presidential elections on February 15, and municipal elections on
March 5.  Transfer of power to a new President in 2006, originally scheduled for the
constitutionally mandated date of February 7, is now expected to happen by the end
of February.  Some observers have voiced concern that insisting on elections before
favorable conditions exist risks having the elections seen as unfair, non-inclusive, or
illegitimate. The OAS Secretary General now says that, “Although the electoral
process was slow to get off the ground, considerable progress has been made, which
allows us to be cautiously optimistic about having organized, orderly and credible
elections early in the new year.”2
On November 11, Haiti’s provisional electoral council released a revised slate
of candidates allowed to run out of the 54 who had registered to run.  The 35
remaining candidates include former presidents and prime ministers, some of whom
served under the brutal de facto military regime; the leader of last year’s armed
rebellion, whom the Bush Administration suspects of drug trafficking; a former
Senator accused of political murders; a former mayor of Port-au-Prince who was an
Aristide supporter turned critic; a co-founder of the Group of 184, a civil society
coalition that opposed then-President Aristide; and long-time activists who fought
against the Duvalier and de facto regimes.  Millionaire Haitian-American
businessman Dumarsais Simeus was prohibited from running because he had not
presented proof of Haitian nationality (according to the Haitian constitution, Haitian
nationality is lost by naturalization in another country; Simeus reportedly had a U.S.
passport).
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3 In Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, the higher the
number, the higher the perception of corruption.  In 2002, Haiti was ranked 89th out of 102
countries; in 2003, Haiti was ranked 131st out  of 133, and corruption there was described
as “pervasive”; in 2004, Haiti was ranked 145th out of 145.  Available online from
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4 See CRS Report RL33156, Haiti: International Assistance Strategy for the Interim
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5 Pablo Bachelet, “Rights Groups says Civilians Killed; Human Rights Activists filed a
Petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Accusing Peacekeepers
of Killing Civilians in Haiti,” Miami Herald, Nov. 16, 2005.
6 “General Assembly Increases Funding for UN Missions in Haiti, Cote D’Ivoire,” States
News Service, Nov. 25, 2005.
The interim government says its investigation into the ousted Aristide
Administration uncovered embezzlement of millions of dollars of public funds. The
Central Unit for Financial Information reported that millions of dollars in public
funds were illegally transferred to private institutions created by Aristide and that an
estimated $20 million were transferred to personal foreign accounts belonging to
Aristide.  The interim government filed a suit in U.S. federal court November 2
alleging that Aristide and eight co-defendants broke U.S. law by transferring public
funds to personal foreign accounts.  Aristide’s lawyer dismissed the lawsuit as
“baseless” and said that it was part of a government misinformation campaign against
Aristide.  Observers made allegations of corruption and misuse of public funds
throughout much of Aristide’s second term.  Transparency International has reported
Haiti as one of the most corrupt countries in the world for several years.3
Noting the current interim government’s difficulties in organizing elections and
voicing concern that the ongoing violence and human rights violations create an
intimidating atmosphere that inhibits political participation at a national and local
level, some critics describe the LaTortue government as weak and partisan. Others
note that the government has enacted some reforms.  With international support,
some progress has been made toward the objectives outlined at the International
Donors Conference on Haiti in July 2004, including voter registration, improvements
in fiscal transparency, jobs creation, and broader access to clean water and other
services.4
A group of human rights activists accused U.N. peacekeepers of killing civilians
and the U.S. government of arming security forces who abuse human rights in
petitions filed before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on
November 15.  U.N. commanders have denied that they are targeting civilians.5
The U.N. General Assembly approved an additional $46.41 million in funding
for the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on November 25.  The
increase, from $494.89 million, will cover the cost of the temporary increase in the
mission’s troops to strengthen security for the elections and the following transition
to a new government.6
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Aristide’s First Term in Office
 Jean-Bertrand Aristide was first elected President in December 1990, in
elections that were widely heralded as the first free and fair elections in Haiti’s then-
186-year history.  A Roman Catholic priest of the radical left,  Aristide’s fiery
sermons contributed to  the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship.  The most
controversial of 11 presidential candidates, Aristide won a landslide victory with
67.5% of the vote.  His inauguration took place in February 1991, on the fifth
anniversary of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s flight into exile.
President Aristide was faced with some of the most serious and persistent social,
economic, and political problems in the Western Hemisphere.  After eight months
in office, Aristide had received mixed reviews.  He was credited with curbing crime
in the capital, reducing the number of employees in bloated state enterprises, and
taking actions to bring the military under civilian control.  But some observers
questioned his government’s commitment to democracy.  Opposition leaders and
others criticized him for not establishing a cooperative relationship among the
democratic elements, failing to  consult the legislature in appointments as required
by the Constitution, and for manipulating the judicial system in the prosecution of
Duvalierists.  His record in the area of respect for human rights was also mixed.  He
was criticized for appearing to condone mob violence, but was also credited with
significantly reducing human rights violations while he was in office.
Some observers believed that during his eight-month tenure, Aristide
contributed to political polarization within Haiti by refusing to condemn violent acts
of retribution, and holding out the threat of mob violence against those who disagreed
with him.  On September 30, 1991, days after a speech in which some contend
Aristide threatened the bourgeoisie for not having helped his government enough,
Aristide was overthrown by the military.  Some maintained that the bourgeoisie
financially supported the coup leaders.
Most human rights monitors credit Aristide’s first administration with being the
first Haitian government to address the need to improve respect for human rights, and
the needs of the poor majority.  They also asserted that progress made during his term
was undone by the military regime that followed.  Most sources credit Aristide with
creating a much greater sense of security in Haiti during his first term than there had
been in years.  According to the State Department human rights reports for 1991 and
1992, there were no reports of disappearances during Aristide’s eight-month term and
dozens in the months following the coup.  The State Department estimated coup-
related deaths at 300-500 at the time, while Amnesty International estimated them to
number over 1,500.
Restoration of Aristide to Office
The leaders of the military coup faced stronger international sanctions than did
previous coup leaders in Haiti, mainly because a democratic government had been
overthrown.  For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands
that Aristide be restored to office.  U.S. policy consisted of pressuring the de facto
Haitian government to restore constitutional democracy to Haiti.  Under the
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Administration of President George H. W. Bush, measures included cutting off
assistance to the Haitian government; imposing trade embargoes, as called for by the
Organization of American States and the United Nations; and supporting OAS and
U.N. diplomatic efforts.  While some observers believed that the Administration of
President William J. Clinton intensified pressure on the Haitian regime and helped
advance negotiations to restore democracy to Haiti, others felt it did not apply enough
pressure.  After the collapse of the Governors Island Accord, which called for the
military regime’s resignation and Aristide’s return by October 30, 1993,7 critics
increased pressure on the Clinton Administration to change its policy.  The
Administration then took a tougher stance toward the military regime, imposing ever-
stiffer sanctions, and ultimately ordering a military intervention to remove it.
On September 18, 1994, when it learned that a U.S. military intervention had
been launched, the military regime signed an agreement with the United States
providing for Aristide’s return.  It also called for the immediate, unopposed entry of
U.S. troops, a legislative amnesty for the military, and the resignation of the military
leadership.  President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, under the
protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops.  On March 31, 1995, having declared that a
“secure and stable environment” had been established, the United States transferred
responsibility for the mission to the United Nations.8
Completion of Aristide’s First Term, 
and the Preval Administration
Following his return, President Aristide took steps to break with the pattern in
which a military-dominated police force was associated with human rights abuses.
Haiti, with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old military, established an interim
police force of selected ex-military personnel, and began to train a professional,
civilian Haitian National Police force.  The level of reported violence, flight of
refugees, and alleged assassinations dropped markedly from very high levels during
the de facto military regime.
Also in 1995,  President Aristide took steps to hold democratic elections, with
substantial assistance from the United States and the international community.  Most
first-round parliamentary and municipal elections were held in June 1995.  Although
the deadly violence which had marred past Haitian elections did not occur, election
observers alleged that there were numerous irregularities.  Several re-run or runoff
elections were held from July to October.  Pro-Aristide candidates won a large share
of the seats.  Presidential elections were held December 17, 1995.  The Haitian
constitution prevented Aristide from running for a second consecutive term.  Rene
Preval, an Aristide supporter, won, with 89% of votes cast, but with a low voter
turnout of only 28%, and with many parties boycotting the election.
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Preval assumed office in February 1996.  He launched a program to privatize
government enterprise through joint ventures with private capital.  Despite public
protests against the economic reforms, the Haitian Senate passed privatization and
administrative reform laws, allowing the release of millions of dollars in foreign aid
through the International Monetary Fund.  Protests against the associated austerity
measures continued, however.  One of the most vocal critics of the proposed
economic austerity program was former President Aristide.  In January 1997 he
formed a new party, Lavalas Family, as a vehicle for his presidential bid in the year
2000.
The 2000 Haitian Elections.  The Haitian parliamentary elections in 2000
were an attempt to resolve disputed elections from 1997, which had triggered an
electoral crisis at the time.  Saying that the 1997 elections were marred by fraud,
Preval’s Prime Minister resigned.  Haiti was then without a prime minister for a year
and a half, with four failed attempts to name a new one, and no resolution to the 1997
elections controversy.  In January 1999, President Preval declared that most of
Parliament’s term had expired, although elections had not been held to replace them.
He then installed members of his Cabinet and an electoral council by decree.  He
continued to  rule by decree through the end of his term in February 2001.  In July
1999, President Rene Preval signed a new electoral law that effectively annulled the
disputed April 1997 elections and provided for new elections.
The United States allotted $16 million over two fiscal years for elections
assistance for the 2000 Haitian vote.  The aid supported the provisional electoral
council, whose tasks included the registration of almost 4 million eligible voters,
issuing voter identification cards for the first time, and organizing legislative and
municipal elections for some 10,000 posts in May 2000.  Every elected position in
the country was on the ballot except for president and eight Senate seats.
Many observers hoped these elections would mean that, after two years of a
deadlocked government and more than a year of President Preval ruling by decree,
a new parliament could be installed and international aid released.  Instead, the
elections brought Haiti into another crisis.  Both domestic and international observers
noted irregularities in the tabulation of election results for some Senate seats.
Nonetheless, the electoral council affirmed those results, which favored former
President Aristide’s Lavalas party.  In September 2000, thousands of protesters
shouting anti-Aristide and anti-Lavalas slogans called for the resignation of the
Lavalas-controlled legislature.  The OAS tried to broker an agreement between
Lavalas and the opposition, to no avail.
Presidential elections were held on November 26, 2000.  Because the Haitian
government refused to address the earlier contested election results, the United States
and other international donors withheld election assistance and refused to send
observers, and opposition parties boycotted them.  Although Aristide won the
election with a reported 91.5% of the vote, turnout was very low, with estimates
ranging from 5% to 20% of eligible voters participating.
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Aristide’s Second Term in Office
As President-elect, Aristide wrote a letter to outgoing U.S. President Clinton,
promising to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms, including
correcting the problems of the May 2000 elections.  According to the White House
at the time, no new promises were made by the United States.9 The Administration
of George W. Bush, which took office on January 20, 2001, accepted the reforms set
forth in the letter as necessary steps for the Aristide government to make.  Aristide
took office again on February 7, 2001.  At his inauguration, the United States was
represented by its ambassador.
During President Aristide’s second term, increases in political violence renewed
concerns over security and police effectiveness.  In 2001, President Aristide
announced a “zero tolerance” policy toward suspected criminals.  According to
various human rights reports, this announcement was followed by numerous
extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police and lynchings by mobs.  The
government’s respect for freedom of the press continued to deteriorate.  According
to the State Department’s February 2004 Human Rights Practices Report, “The
[Haitian] government’s human rights record remained poor, with political and civil
officials implicated in serious abuses.”
OAS/CARICOM Efforts to Resolve Haitian Conflict
Efforts to resolve the electoral dispute frustrated the international community
for years.  At the third Summit of the Americas in April 2001, hemispheric leaders
singled out Haiti as a country whose democratic practices were in trouble and asked
the OAS to try again to help negotiate a solution to the crisis.  The OAS had been
mediating on-again off-again talks between the Aristide government and the
opposition alliance Democratic Convergence.  In OAS-mediated talks in July 2001,
the Aristide government and the opposition agreed to hold new elections for local
and most parliamentary seats, but could not agree on a schedule.
Tensions and violence in Haiti increased dramatically after Aristide assumed his
second term in office.  Supporters of both President Aristide’s Lavalas Family party
and the opposition coalition Convergence reportedly engaged in the cycle of violent
revenge.  In January 2002, the OAS Permanent Council passed  Resolution 806
establishing an OAS Mission in Haiti and calling for the Haitian government to do
all it could to ensure a climate of security and confidence necessary to hold free and
fair elections.  In July 2002, the OAS released a report stating that a December 2001
attack on the National Palace was not an attempted coup, as the Aristide
Administration had claimed, and that “[T]he political opposition did not participate
in the planning or in the execution of the attack.”  It also said that the government
and Lavalas party officials gave arms to militants who plundered and burned the
homes and offices of opposition members after the palace attack.10
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Also in July 2002,  the opposition proposed that presidential elections be re-held
as well.  All  the OAS member states recognized Aristide as Haiti’s legitimate head
of state, however, and the OAS Secretary General said that the November 2000
elections “have never been the subject of an OAS or Summit of the Americas
mandate,” meaning that only the disputed May 2000 parliamentary elections were
within the OAS mandate to negotiate a solution.11
In September 2002, the OAS passed Resolution 822 that tried to break the
political impasse by recognizing the government’s “constitutional electoral
prerogatives.”  In other words, it removed the obstacle of having to complete
negotiations with the opposition before elections could be held.  A consensus
resolution, negotiated by member states and voted for by Haiti, stated that legislative
and local elections were to be held in 2003, on a date to be set by a new Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP).  An “autonomous, independent, credible and neutral CEP”
was to be established by November 4, 2002.  Haiti failed to meet that deadline, in
part because the Democratic Convergence refused to name a representative for the
council until the government dealt with security issues and made all reparations to
opposition forces for damage done by government supporters in December 2001.
Aristide named a partial CEP in February 2003.  In June 2003, the OAS passed
Resolution 1959, regretting that neither the government nor the opposition had fully
implemented their obligations under the previous two resolutions, and urging the
government to create a safe environment for elections and the opposition to help
actively  form a CEP.  Those steps were not taken, and elections did not take place
in 2003.
In November 2003, the new U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, James Foley, described
the current state of Haiti as “very worrisome from all points of view: poverty,
insecurity, economic development, infrastructure, environment, health, etc.,” and said
that it was essential that Haiti resolve its political impasse so that Haiti and its
international donors “can work together to resolve all of these fundamental
problems.”  A U.N.-appointed human rights expert said in November that the human
rights situation there had “again deteriorated,” criticizing the ongoing impunity of
human rights violators; the “persistent dysfunctions in the administration of justice,”
and the frequently violent suppression of freedom of expression and especially of
peaceful demonstrations.  Saying he was “very disturbed” at the rising political
violence there, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell backed a proposal by the Roman
Catholic Bishops Conference of Haiti to set up a council of advisors to help Aristide
govern until new parliamentary elections were held.  Aristide supported the initiative,
but the opposition, which accused Aristide of corruption and mismanagement,
rejected it.  In January 2004, the CARICOM secured Aristide’s agreement to disarm
political gangs, appoint a new prime minister, and form an advisory council.
Opposition groups refused to negotiate a settlement or participate in elections unless
Aristide resigned.  Two-thirds of Haitian legislators’ terms expired in January 2004
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without elections having been held to replace them. President Aristide began ruling
by decree. 
The conflict escalated when armed rebels seized Haiti’s fourth largest city,
Gonaives, on February 5, and the armed rebellion spread to other cities.  Street battles
ensued when police forces tried to regain control, leaving dozens dead.  CARICOM
continued trying to negotiate a solution to the crisis.  Civil opposition groups
operating mainly in the capital denied any links to the armed rebellions.  After being
criticized by some for statements appearing to indicate it might support the elected
President’s removal, Administration officials said the remarks were not intended to
signal support for Aristide’s resignation, and that the Bush Administration sought a
peaceful solution to the crisis.  Secretary of State Colin Powell and other foreign
diplomats suggested the possibility of bringing in outside police forces, but only to
support the enforcement of a political agreement reached by the Haitian government
and the opposition, such as the one proposed by CARICOM.  The opposition rejected
the agreement.
Aristide’s Departure
With rebel forces moving toward the capital of Port-au-Prince on February 28,
2004, the Bush Administration increased pressure on Aristide to resign, stating that
“His failure to adhere to democratic principles has contributed to the deep
polarization and violent unrest that we are witnessing in Haiti today.”  Aristide
resigned the next day and flew into exile. He has since said he was kidnaped, a
charge the White House denies.  Following succession protocol outlined in the
Haitian constitution, Supreme Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre was sworn in
as President on February 29.  The United Nations unanimously passed a resolution
authorizing an international force, initially comprising U.S. Marines, and French and
Canadian police and military forces, to help restore order.12  That force was replaced
by U.N. peacekeepers three months later, in June 2004.  A tripartite commission,
based on an element of the CARICOM proposal, was formed to help run an interim
government.  CARICOM said it was not prepared to hold discussions with Haiti’s
new leaders, however, and called for an investigation into Aristide’s “relinquishing
of the Presidency” by an independent international body such as the United Nations.
During a demonstration on March 7, 2004, in which protesters called for the
exiled Aristide to stand trial for alleged corruption and human rights violations, six
people were reportedly killed by suspected Aristide loyalists. U.S. Marines killed at
least six Haitians who they said were trying to attack them.  Speaking from exile in
the capital of the Central African Republic on March 8, Aristide asserted, “I am the
elected president,” and appealed for “peaceful resistance” by his supporters to what
he called the “occupation” of Haiti.13  After Jamaica allowed Aristide to travel there
for a ten-week visit, Haiti’s acting prime minister withdrew its ambassador from
Kingston, saying Aristide was “disturbing Haiti’s fragile order” by visiting the island
only 125 miles away.  The Jamaican government said Aristide agreed to their
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condition that he not use his visit to launch a campaign to be reinstated as president.14
Aristide went into exile in South Africa on May 31, 2004.
The Interim Government
Following succession protocol outlined in the Haitian constitution, Supreme
Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre was sworn in as President on February 29,
2004.  A tripartite commission, based on an element of the CARICOM proposal,
helped establish an interim government headed by Prime Minister Gerard LaTortue.
The Commission was composed of one representative each of Aristide’s Lavalas
Family party, the civil opposition, and the international community.  LaTortue’s
cabinet consists of technocrats without strong party affiliations and does not include
either Lavalas or the Democratic Convergence. The new minister of Interior and
National Security is Herard Abraham, former head of the Haitian army during
Aristide’s first term, in 1991.  Abraham retired about three months before the 1991
coup took place.
Showing his support for the interim government in Haiti, Secretary of State
Colin Powell visited Haiti on April 5, announcing several U.S. initiatives.  These
included the immediate deployment of a seven-member team to advise the interim
government on security issues; a three-year employment generation program to
improve municipal infrastructure and provide tens of thousands of jobs; and a team
to assess the technical assistance needed by the Haitian Finance Ministry and to assist
Haitian authorities “in the recovery of assets that may have been illicitly diverted.”
The U.S. will provide an additional $9 million to the Organization of American
States (OAS) Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti, for elections
and democracy building activities; and $500,000 for a variety of elections-related
activities such as public education programs, public opinion polling, and training for
political parties to develop candidates.  Powell also said that humanitarian
development programs would be expanded “to ensure that the medical and nutritional
needs of Haiti’s most disadvantaged people are met.”15  Relations between the U.S.
and other Caribbean governments remain strained as Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) nations continue to withhold recognition of the LaTortue government
and maintain that Aristide is still Haiti’s legitimate elected leader.16
On July 20, international donors pledged more than $1 billion over the next two
years to help Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and improve
basic services.  The United States committed to provide $230 million for FY2004-
FY2005.  The interim government signed an agreement with the U.N. and the OAS
on August 23 to hold presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in 2005, with
a new president to take office on February 7, 2006.  The U.N. established a trust fund
for the elections, started with $9 million in U.S. funds, which they hope will reach
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$41 million.  Members of former President Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party have
threatened to boycott the elections in light of their alleged political persecution by the
interim government.
Many observers express concern over the actions of former members of the
Haitian military since Aristide’s departure. Many former military personnel have
demanded reinstatement of the Haitian army, which was disbanded by President
Aristide in 1995 following a period of multiple military coups and gross violations
of human rights carried out under military rule. The U.S. government and human
rights organizations have objected to armed rebels being given any formal role in
Haitian security forces.  
The interim government increased concerns in April when Prime Minister
LaTortue called the rebels “freedom fighters,” and Haiti’s top police official in the
northern region met with former paramilitary leader Louis Jodel Chamblain and Guy
Philippe to negotiate roles for their fighters in the police force.17  Chamberlain had
been convicted in absentia for killing a Justice Minister and chief financier of former
President Aristide; Guy Philippe was accused of leading a coup attempt against
former President Preval.  In June, LaTortue assured U.S. officials that former soldiers
would be subject to the same criteria and human rights vetting procedures as other
applicants for joining the Haitian National Police.  Nonetheless, some observers
remain concerned, noting that  government discussions of disarmament have focused
more on former Aristide supporters than on armed rebels and former members of the
army.  In addition, the government presided over a rushed re-trial of Chamblain, in
which he was acquitted of the 1993 political assassination he had been convicted of
in absentia.
Some critics describe the LaTortue government as weak and partisan. They note
the current interim government’s difficulties in organizing elections and voice
concern that ongoing violence and human rights violations create an intimidating
atmosphere that inhibits political participation at both the national and local level.
Both the State Department and Amnesty International report human rights abuses
against Aristide supporters under the interim government.  Hundreds of Aristide
supporters have been jailed without charge for months, including former Prime
Minister Yvon Neptune, who was held for 16 months before being charged and
remains in custody.  (See “Protection of Human Rights...” section below.)
Others note that the government has enacted some reforms.  For example, the
interim government prepared a budget for FY2005, the first one to be prepared before
a fiscal year began since 1996-1997. With international support, some progress has
been made toward other objectives outlined at the International Donors Conference
on Haiti in July 2004, including 70% voter registration, improvements in fiscal
transparency, jobs creation, and broader access to clean water and other services. 
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The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) assumed authority on
June 1, 2004, although few of the U.N. troops had arrived by then.  The MINUSTAH
mandate includes helping to ensure a secure and stable environment, fostering
democratic governance, and supporting the promotion and protection of human
rights. The Brazilian commander of MINUSTAH said that without a full complement
of troops it was difficult to maintain law and order. The mission had initial
authorization for a force of about 8,000, made up of 6,700 military troops and 1,622
civilian police. Yet in May 2005, almost a year after the mission was authorized,
forces were still below that level, with 6,435 peacekeeping troops and 1,413 civilian
police from 41 countries in country.  According to the State Department, the United
States had a total of four U.S. military advisers and 25 civilian police participating
in the U.N. mission. Furthermore, the mandate was established in April 2004, prior
to flooding and hurricanes that left thousands of Haitians dead and thousands more
homeless.  MINUSTAH provided assistance in the provision of emergency assistance
following the natural disasters, stretching its resources even thinner.  MINUSTAH
has been urging international donors to accelerate the disbursement of $1 billion in
aid pledged for 2004-2006 to support their efforts.
Both the Haitian government and MINUSTAH have complained that the other
is not doing enough to establish security in Haiti.  Nonetheless, in October 2004
Haitian police officers and U.N. soldiers made a joint show of force to try to quell a
spate of violence, arresting suspected militants and searching for weapons. Security
improved, but the situation is expected to remain volatile, especially in the months
leading up to elections.
To encourage the international community to make Haiti a higher priority, the
entire 15-member U.N. Security Council traveled to Haiti April 13-16, 2005.  Calling
“dramatic” poverty “the prime cause of instability in Haiti,” the delegation
emphasized the need for a long-term development strategy.  It also said that holding
elections was the most pressing challenge for Haiti and the international community.
It noted that the mission had improved security conditions in the preceding months
but could do more in areas such as police reform.  The Security Council also urged
the interim government to implement “without delay” the mission’s proposed
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program.18   MINUSTAH’s mandate
was extended until February 15, 2006, and the U.N. Security Council expressed its
support for a U.N. presence in Haiti for “as long as necessary.”19  MINUSTAH was
also expanded by 800 military personnel and 275 civilian police and restructured to
increase its ability to deter violence and provide security for the upcoming elections.
MINUSTAH troops cracked down on street gangs in the summer of 2005, and
since then killings and kidnappings have declined, according to MINUSTAH Chief
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Juan Gabriel Valdes.  Nonetheless, gangs continue to operate in the slums of Port-au-
Prince.20  U.N. Special Envoy to Haiti Juan Gabriel Valdes reported in November
2005 that peacekeepers had “stabilized” the country but cautioned that the elections
could still be disrupted by violent groups.21
A group of human rights activists accused U.N. peacekeepers of killing civilians
and the U.S. government of arming security forces who abuse human rights in
petitions filed before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on
November 15.  U.N. commanders have denied that they are targeting civilians.22
The U.N. General Assembly approved an additional $46.41 million in funding
for the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on November 25.  The
increase, from $494.89 million, will cover the cost of the temporary increase in the
mission’s troops to strengthen security for the elections and the following transition
to a new government.23
The 2005 Elections
The interim government signed an agreement with the U.N. and the OAS on
August 23 to hold elections in fall 2005.  The U.N. established a trust fund for the
elections, started with $9 million in U.S. funds, which they hope will reach $41
million.  Elections, first scheduled for October, have been postponed four times.  The
Prime Minister has said the first round presidential and legislative elections will now
be held December 11 or 18.  The electoral council still has not announced a new date,
however.  Runoff presidential elections and local elections will follow on later dates.
Observers debate whether conditions are yet conducive to holding free, fair, and
safe elections.  A member of the Provisional Electoral Council said that elections
may have to be delayed until late December or early January to allow time for
technical preparations such as preparing ballots, distributing voter identification
cards, and setting up polling sites.24  While acknowledging remaining technical
difficulties, the OAS Secretary General said that the successful registration of about
3.4 million voters, or about 70% of voters, meant that elections could take place in
early December.  A State Department official described the registration process as
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the “most comprehensive, transparent, and fraud-free ever conducted” in Haiti’s
history.25
Members of former President Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party have threatened
to boycott the elections and claim to face political persecution by the interim
government, charges backed by human rights groups and other observers. Hundreds
of Lavalas members, including Aristide’s former Prime Minister, were arrested and
held for many months without charge.  In July 2005, the interim government arrested
Reverend Gerard Jean-Juste for alleged involvement in the abduction and murder of
a Haitian journalist, charges the New York Times called “dubious.” Jean-Juste was
in Miami when the abduction occurred and denies the allegations.  Others claim his
arrest was an effort to prevent the popular Lavalas leader from running for President
and to weaken his party.26
On November 12, the electoral council released a revised slate of presidential
candidates, allowing 35 of the 54 who had registered to run.  Former President Rene
Preval (1995-2000) is considered the most popular candidate.  Although Preval had
been a supporter of Aristide, as President he tried to institute economic reforms that
were strongly opposed by Aristide.  Preval is remembered for building roads,
schools, and hospitals during his term.  Although he is running as an independent and
has reportedly said almost nothing about his political agenda, he is supported by
grassroots members of Lavalas.
The party, Haiti’s largest and best organized, is split, however.  The candidate
the party nominated, priest Gerard Jean-Juste, was disqualified by the provisional
electoral council (although he had not yet agreed to be the candidate) and is still
being held in prison.  The Lavalas leadership is supporting coalition candidate Marc
Bazin, a technocrat who once worked for the World Bank.  Critics see Bazin as an
opportunist: since losing the 1990 presidential race to Aristide, he has been an
outspoken critic of Aristide but is now running under the banner of Aristide’s party.
After Aristide’s overthrow in 1991, he served as Prime Minister in the de facto
military regime characterized by its high number of human rights violations.    
A leader of the armed rebellion that contributed to Aristide’s ouster, Guy
Philippe, is also running for President.  A former member of the Haitian military and
police commissioner, Philippe fled into exile after being accused of involvement in
a coup attempt against then-President Preval in 2000.  The Bush Administration
suspects Philippe of drug trafficking.27
Head of the interim National Police in 1994, Dany Toussaint is now running for
President.  Toussaint, who received FBI training that included human rights courses,
once enjoyed U.S. support, but by late 1995 was perceived as using the police as an
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enforcement branch of the Lavalas party.  The U.S. government pressured then-
President Preval to drop him as head of the new Haitian National Police.  When talk
first emerged of Toussaint running for President several years ago, when he was an
extremely popular Haitian Senator, a U.S. official reportedly said, “He’s a nefarious
character.  We believe he is involved in political murders.  We believe he’s involved
in drug trafficking.  And we would find it unacceptable for him to hold any position
in the government.”28 
The most controversial candidate, Dumarsais Simeus, a wealthy Texas
businessman who was born in Haiti to illiterate rice farmers, has now been removed
from the race.  The electoral council first barred Simeus from running because he did
not meet the constitutional requirements of being a Haitian citizen and residing in the
country for five consecutive years before the date of elections.  In October, Haiti’s
supreme court overruled that decision, even though Simeus is a long-time U.S.
resident who reportedly holds a U.S. passport.  In November, the electoral council
ruled that neither Simeus nor another candidate could run for president because they
held dual nationality, which disqualifies a candidate under the Haitian constitution.
Current Congressional Concerns
The main issue for U.S.-Haiti policy during the 109th Congress has been how to
foster stability and development in Haiti.  Remarking on the nexus between
development, security, and human rights, the chairman of a U.N. Advisory Group on
Haiti recommended addressing poverty reduction, demobilization and reintegration,
political reconciliation, and judicial and security sector reform.29  Some policymakers
argue that security is the top priority and are debating how best to support the
existing U.N. Mission, or whether to expand the U.N.’s role, with some observers
urging some sort of long-term international intervention. As political disarray and
human rights violations continue, some observers are expressing concern that
conditions will not be conducive to safe elections.  Others argue that establishing a
legitimate government through fair, credible elections is the fist step toward stability.
Support of Democracy
Many in Congress have been concerned that Haiti renew its transition to
democracy, in particular that it hold democratic elections in accordance with Haiti’s
1987 constitution.  In congressional hearings in 2004, the Bush Administration
reiterated that U.S. policy in Haiti is to support democracy and the strengthening of
democratic institutions. Then-Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs Roger Noriega defended the Administration’s decision not to send in troops
while Aristide was still in Haiti.  He said that although Aristide voiced support for
the Caricom agreement, he continued to foment violence through his armed
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supporters, and that the Administration decided supporting his continued rule was not
a sustainable policy and not worth risking U.S. lives for.30
At the same hearings, several Members of Congress harshly criticized the
Administration, however, for its role in Aristide’s departure from Haiti, saying that
the Bush Administration refused to provide any assistance to stop the escalating
violence in Haiti until Aristide resigned.  Some voiced concern that the
Administration’s actions set a dangerous precedent, that the ouster of a
democratically elected government by violent thugs would be tolerated if the
government was no longer popular or favored by the current U.S. administration.
Some Members  have called for  independent investigations into what they refer to
as the coup d’état that removed Aristide from office, and the role of the U.S. in his
departure.  Some observers are also concerned about the effect Aristide’s claim, and
his call for his supporters to resist the international “occupation,” will have on efforts
to restore order and stability in Haiti. 
The formation of a legitimate transitional government through a constitutional
process was made difficult by Aristide’s claim that he remains Haiti’s democratically
elected president, and by the lack of a legally-constituted legislature  to authorize a
transitional government.  When the office of the President becomes vacant, the
Haitian constitution calls for the President of the Haitian Supreme Court to head an
interim government.  Accordingly, Boniface Alexandre was named interim President,
although there was no functioning legislature to confirm his appointment, as called
for in the constitution.  The constitution also calls for the election of a new President
to be held between 45 and 90 days after the vacancy occurs.  In April 2004, the
interim government reached an agreement with opposition political groups to hold
elections in 2005, with a new president to take office on February 7, 2006.
A tripartite commission, consisting of one representative each from Aristide’s
Lavalas party, the civil opposition, and the international community, was formed to
help oversee the transition process.  Creation of a tripartite commission, also known
as the “Council of Elders,” was part of a Caricom proposal that was agreed to by
then-President Aristide, but rejected by the civil opposition.  Caricom is still
withholding recognition of the interim government. Some observers questioned the
validity of the tripartite commission as a legitimate part of an interim government.
Concerns have also been raised about the civil opposition as represented by the
Democratic Platform in Haiti.  Some observers question the right of the civil
opposition to participate in an interim government, given their rejection of political
solutions that did not involve Aristide’s resignation, including the one proposed by
Caricom and supported by the United States.  Others wonder to what extent the
opposition had a unified agenda beyond the removal of Aristide from office.  Some
have asked what, if any, relationship the opposition had with the armed rebels who
took over much of Haiti prior to Aristide’s departure.  Both the opposition and the
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Bush Administration state that there was no relationship between the armed and
unarmed opposition at the time.
At a July 2004 conference on Haiti, international donors pledged more than $1
billion over the next two years to help Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen
institutions, and improve basic services.  A key component of the strategy endorsed
by donors at that conference is strengthening political governance and promoting
national dialogue.  The U.N., through its mission in Haiti, and the OAS have taken
on major roles in supporting the Haitian election process, with financial and technical
support from the United States and other bilateral donors.  Even if elections go well,
U.N. officials and others warn that the subsequent governing process will not be easy.
Haitian political parties are mostly driven by personalities rather than political
platforms.  Years of international efforts to get a national dialogue going have proven
frustrating.  Politicians lack a tradition of political compromise or serving as a “loyal
opposition.”  Yet many analysts agree that Haitians must develop a consensus on
political development and poverty reduction for Haiti to move beyond the political
stalemate it has been stuck in for the past decade.
U.S. Assistance to Haiti
From FY1996 to FY1999, the Clinton Administration provided approximately
$100 million annually in foreign assistance to Haiti, plus about $868 million in
Department of Defense costs for peacekeeping and security operations related to
embargo enforcement and the international intervention.  Beginning in 2000, in
response to the unresolved elections dispute, the Clinton Administration redirected
U.S. humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organizations, rather than
through the Haitian government.  The Bush Administration has continued this policy.
Aid began to decrease at the end of the Clinton Administration, and continued to do
so for the first two years of the Bush Administration, with $79 million in FY2000,
$73 million in FY2001, and $56 million in FY2002.  The original request for
FY2003 was $47 million; the Administration later increased aid to $72 million. The
Bush Administration launched an initiative in 2003 to prevent the transmission of the
HIV/AIDS virus from mothers to children; Haiti was one of 14 countries included in
the program.  According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
between four and six thousand Haitian children are born with the virus each year.
Before the current unrest, Haiti was going to receive an estimated $55 million
in U.S. foreign aid in FY2004.  An additional $0.54 million in humanitarian
assistance was made available when the Bush Administration declared Haiti a
disaster on February 18, 2004, and more costs were incurred with the U.S. military
forces in Haiti.  The initial request for FY2005, made before U.S. forces were sent
to Haiti, was for $54 million.
Congress has monitored aid to Haiti closely, and has established a number of
conditions on this assistance over the years.  The FY2000 foreign aid act (P.L. 106-
113) outlined congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti, including “aggressive
action to support the Haitian National Police;” ensuring that elections are free and
fair; developing indigenous human rights monitoring capacity; facilitating more
privatization of state-owned enterprises; a sustainable agricultural development
program; and establishing an economic development fund to encourage U.S.
CRS-17
investment in Haiti.  The act also required the president to regularly report to
Congress on the Haitian government’s progress in areas of concern to Congress.
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (P.L. 106-429) shifted
conditions, prohibiting aid to the Haitian government until Haiti held free and fair
elections to seat a new parliament and was fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to
interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. The only condition in FY2002 foreign aid
appropriations law (P.L. 107-115) required notification to Congress prior to provision
of any aid to Haiti.  The FY2003 foreign assistance appropriations act (P.L. 108-7)
provided for “not less than $52.5 million” in food assistance program funds to be
allocated to Haiti (Section 551), but contained no other conditions on aid to Haiti.
The FY2004 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 108-199, Division D) continued
to allow Haiti to purchase defense articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard,
prohibited the use of funds to issue a visa to any alien involved in extrajudicial and
political killings in Haiti, allocated $5 million to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti
and $19 million in Refugee and Entrant Assistance funds to communities with large
concentrations of Haitian (and Cuban) refugees of varying ages for healthcare and
education.
The FY2005 consolidated appropriations act (P.L. 108-447, Conference Report
H.Rept. 108-792) contains several provisions regarding Haiti.  The act (1) makes
International Military Education and Training funds and Foreign Military Financing
available only through regular notification procedures; (2) appropriates $20 million
for child survival and health programs, $25 million for development assistance,
including agriculture, environment, and basic education programs; $40 million in
ESF for judicial reform, police training, and national elections; “sufficient funds” for
the OAS to help Haiti hold elections in 2005, and $2 million to Zanmi Lasante for
maternal and child health activities; (3) allows Haiti to purchase defense articles and
services for its Coast Guard; (4) notes disappointment on the Haitian government’s
role in the trial and acquittal of Louis Jodel Chamblain, and the deteriorating security
human rights situation; (5) requires a report within 90 days on a multi-year assistance
strategy; (6) and encourages the Administration to help Haitian and NGO officials
to devise a reforestation strategy and to provide a report on that strategy within 180
days.  The conference report was agreed to in both houses on November 20 and
signed into law December 8, 2004.  The earlier Senate version had made several
findings regarding improving security in Haiti, concluding that “the failure to
establish a secure and stable environment and to conduct credible and inclusive
elections will likely result in Haiti’s complete transition from a failed state to a
criminal state.”
The 108th Congress considered but did not pass a trade preferences bill for Haiti.
The Senate passed the Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity (HERO) Act of 2004
(S. 2261) in July, which would have given Haiti additional preferential trade
treatment if it made certain democratic and economic reforms.  Current benefits
under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act allow duty-free access for apparel
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made in the region from U.S. components.31 The House Ways and Means Trade
subcommittee held a hearing on the issue September 22, 2004.  Supporters of trade
preferences for Haiti introduced new HERO bills for consideration by both houses
in October and November 2005.  (For  further information, see “Legislation” section
below, and CRS Report RS21839, Haitian Textile Industry: Impact of Proposed
Trade Assistance, by Bernard Gelb.)
In July 2004, the Bush Administration announced an additional $120 million in
assistance to Haiti, for a total of about $230 million for FY2004-FY2005.  According
to USAID, the aid will be distributed as follows:  $22 million for job creation; $45
million for government infrastructure support; $26 million for improved security
through improved administration of justice; $122 million for humanitarian aid,
including health care, nutrition, and education; and $15 million for elections support.
A portion of an additional $100 million appropriated by Congress in supplemental
disaster assistance for the Caribbean region (P.L. 108-324) will go to Haiti as well.
The emergency supplemental appropriations act for FY2005 (P.L. 109-13) provides
that $20 million in Economic Support Funds “should” be made available to Haiti,
$2.5 million of which should be made available for criminal case management, case
tracking, and the reduction of pre-trial detention in Haiti.
The Bush Administration requested $181 million for Haiti for FY2006.  That
request includes $49 million for Development Assistance, $50 million for Economic
Support Funds, $32 million in food aid, $1 million in Foreign Military Financing,
$0.2 million in International Military Education and Training, and $47 million for the
HIV/AIDS Initiative.  The Bush Administration notified Congress in May that it
supported adding another 800 military personnel and 275 civilian police to
MINUSTAH, as recommended by the U.N. Secretary General.32  The ceiling had
been at 6,700 troops and 1,622 police. The State Department also supports the U.N.’s
recommendation that MINUSTAH be restructured to enhance its ability to implement
a disarmament program and provide security for the fall elections.  The
Administration estimated that expansion of the U.N. mission would cost the U.S. an
additional $16 million to $18 million in FY2006.
The 2006 foreign operations appropriations act (P.L. 109-102) stipulates that
International Military Education and Training funds and Foreign Military Financing
may only be provided to Haiti through the regular notification procedures.  Section
549 makes $116.215 million available for Haiti: $20 million for Child Survival and
Health Programs; $30 million for Development Assistance; $50 million for
Economic Support Funds; $15 million for International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement; $1 million for Foreign Military Financing; and $215,000 for
International Military Education and Training.  It also continues to allow the
government of Haiti to purchase defense articles and services under the Arms Export
Control Act for the Coast Guard. 
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Section 549 (c) prohibits any ‘International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement’ funds from being used to transfer excess weapons, ammunition, or
other lethal property of an agency of the United States government to the government
of Haiti for use by the Haitian National Police (HNP) until the Secretary of State
certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that MINUSTAH has vetted the senior
levels of the HNP and has ensured that those credibly alleged to have committed
serious crimes, including drug trafficking and human rights violations, have been
suspended and that the interim government is cooperating in a reform and
restructuring plan for the HNP and the reform of the judicial system as called for in
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1608, adopted on June 22, 2005.
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1990 40.2 1.5 16.0 0.7 0.0 0.1  — 58.5
1991 38.5 12.3 29.1 1.0 0.0 0.3  — 81.2
1992 26.6 4.5 19.6 0.3 0.0 0.0  — 51.0
1993 23.3 24.0 41.3 0.1 0.0 0.0  — 88.7
1994 26.0 36.7 42.7 0.0 0.0 0.0  — 105.4
1995 56.6 56.0 44.0 0.0 3.0 0.0  — 159.6
1996 14.1 45.3 39.2 0.5 0.0 0.2  — 99.3
1997 24.4 53.5 22.5 0.9 0.0 0.3  — 101.6
1998 0.9 65.1 34.9 1.1 0.0 0.3  — 102.3
1999 0.0 65.1 27.0 1.4 0.3 0.2  — 94.0
2000a 0.0 52.5 25.1 1.4 0.0 0.3  — 80.0
2001 0.0 46.9 25.1 1.3 0.0 0.3  — 73.6




















2003 33.2 0.0 36.6 1.7 0.4 0.1  — 71.9
2004 31.7 55.0 30.5 1.4 0.3 0.2 13.0 132.1
2005 est. 45.0 40.0 37.7 1.4 0.3 0.2 39.4 164.0
2006 req. 49.3 50.0 32.5 1.4 1.0 0.2 47.0 181.4
Total 410.7 638.4 526.9 16.1 5.6 2.7 99.4 1,699.8
Source:  U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
a.  FY2000:  additional USAID operating expenses totaling $174.6 million provided in Hurricane Supplemental was made available for Haiti on February 18, 2004.
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Table 2.  DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace
 and Security Commitments, FY1992-FY1996
(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)
Operation FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 Totals
Safe Harbor 9.3  —  —  —  — 9.3
Embargo/Interdiction/
Sanctions Enforcement  — 2.8 65.8  —  — 68.6
Uphold Democracy  —  — 198.2 448.8  — 647.0
UNMIH  —  —  — 56.5 86.9 143.4
Total Haiti 9.3 2.8 264.0 505.3 86.9 868.3
Source:  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
 
Notes:  This chart consists of the DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and
participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S.
unilateral operations, NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations.
Incremental costs are amounts spent on operations over that which would have been normally spent
on regular salaries, and on routine training, equipment repairs and replacements.  Opinion as to which
of them constitute “peacekeeping” or “peace operations” differ.  U.N. reimbursements are not
deducted. Totals may not add due to rounding.  The Haiti accounts do not include the DOD processing
of Haitian migrants, which totaled $108.1 million in FY1994 and $63.7 million in FY1995.
For further information on the U.S. military intervention in Haiti, see CRS Report RL30184,
Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia:  Background, Outcomes, and “Lessons
Learned” for Kosovo, by Nina M. Serafino, who prepared Table 2 above.
Protection of Human Rights, and Security Conditions
Congress has been concerned with the protection of human rights and with
security conditions within Haiti.  During his first term, in 1995,  President Aristide
took steps to break with the pattern in which a military-dominated police force was
associated with human rights abuses. Haiti, with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old
military, established an interim police force of selected ex-military personnel, and
began to train a professional, civilian Haitian National Police force.  The level of
reported violence, flight of refugees, and alleged assassinations dropped markedly
from very high levels during the de facto military regime.  Following the return to
civilian rule in 1994, Haiti made progress in the protection of human rights, but the
gains made were fragile and threatened by political tensions and problems with
impunity.
During President Aristide’s second term, increases in political violence renewed
concerns over security and police effectiveness.  In 2001, President Aristide
announced a “zero tolerance” policy toward suspected criminals.  According to
various human rights reports, this announcement was followed by numerous
extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police and lynchings by mobs.  The
government’s respect for freedom of the press continued to deteriorate.  According
to the State Department’s February 2004 Human Rights Practices Report, “The
[Haitian] government’s human rights record remained poor, with political and civil
officials implicated in serious abuses.”
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After armed rebellions led to the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
in February 2004, an interim government took over, but security conditions remain
tenuous.  The destruction of prisons and subsequent escape of prisoners in the
turmoil of early 2004 and the government’s granting of amnesty to convicted
criminals in January 2005 further added to instability.  Gangs linked to both former
army and pro-Aristide forces remain heavily armed. The Haitian National Police are
considered understaffed and under equipped to maintain order and have been charged
with human rights abuses.
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has also been
understaffed, as member governments were slow to send the 6,700 troops and 1,622
civilian police that were authorized; it still did not have all of its promised forces as
of May 5, 2005.  Only four U.S. troops are stationed in Haiti as part of that
international mission.  Without a full complement of troops, the Brazilian
commander of MINUSTAH says it is difficult to maintain law and order.
MINUSTAH’s ability to carry out its mandate to establish law and order is further
hampered by the diversion of its resources to help protect and deliver emergency
assistance following natural disasters that left thousands dead or homeless. Several
U.N. peacekeepers have been killed.
Saying that U.N. peacekeepers had failed to maintain security, Prime Minister
LaTortue reportedly asked the Bush Administration in late 2004 to send U.S. troops
to Haiti.  The Department of Defense did not send troops, but about 250 U.S. military
personnel participated in a civic assistance program to help train U.S. military units
in construction and medical care services  as a show of support for Latortue’s
government.33
New concerns over human rights violations were presented by the leaders of the
armed rebellion that contributed to Aristide’s resignation.  Both Louis Jodel
Chamblain and Guy Philippe were members of the Haitian military.  Chamblain is
the alleged leader of death squads responsible for a bloodbath that halted elections
in 1987 and for killing thousands of civilians after the 1991 military coup against
former President Aristide.  The Bush Administration expressed “deep concern” about
the rule of law in Haiti following the acquittal in a rapidly held retrial of Chamblain
and former police official Jackson Joanis in August 2004 for their roles in the 1993
murder of businessman and Aristide supporter Antoine Izmery.  Chamblain had been
convicted in absentia. The State Department called on the interim Haitian
government “to ensure that trials involving accusations of gross human rights
violations and other such crimes be conducted in a credible manner.”34 
Philippe, who was also a police commissioner in Cap Haitien, fled into exile
after being accused of involvement in a coup attempt against President Preval in
2000.  Philippe says he wants to reconstitute the Haitian army and declared himself
its head in March 2004.  He is now running for president in the upcoming elections.
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Both men appear to have a high degree of popular support that might hamper the
international community’s ability to persuade them to disarm.  The Haitian army,
which had a long history of human rights abuses, was disbanded in 1995.  Former
soldiers have staged protests demanding the restoration of the army and 10 years of
back pay.
While some Aristide supporters have allegedly committed human rights
violations, others are reported to face persecution. Some of Aristide’s more militant
supporters beheaded police officers and threatened to do the same to civilian officials
if Aristide was not restored to office (New York Times, October 7, 2004).  Several
Lavalas party officials were arrested; they denied inciting the violence and blamed
the government for not stopping the violence.  Both the State Department and
Amnesty International report human rights abuses against Aristide supporters under
the interim government.  Hundreds of Aristide supporters have been jailed without
charge for months.
Former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune was held without being charged for 16
months and was earlier reported near death after being on a hunger strike.  He
demands that he be released; Caricom and others have called for the release of
Neptune and others who have been held without charge.  While some groups agree
that people should not be held without charge, they are urging the government to
press formal charges and provide for a fair trial. Neptune was finally charged in
September 2005 with masterminding the murder of political opponents in St. Marc.
An independent U.N. expert on human rights visited the town and said there was not
a massacre but confrontations between pro- and anti-Aristide groups that led to
deaths on both sides.35  A U.N. human rights spokesman said that a judge’s decision
to indict Neptune and try him without a jury was unconstitutional.  The official sent
the case to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in October 2005.36
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in October that the U.N. “is deeply
concerned about the ‘pattern of alleged serious misconduct’ by Haitian National
Police officers, including their alleged involvement in the summary execution of at
least nine individuals” at a football game in August.37  Haiti’s Chief of Police, Mario
Andresol, announced a policy of “zero tolerance” for police involvement in criminal
activities on November 2.  Over 20 police officers have been arrested for alleged
involvement in drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extrajudicial murders.38 
In 2005, kidnaping became a frequent and often deadly occurrence.  In May
2005, the State Department ordered nonessential U.S. personnel to leave, warned
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U.S. citizens against traveling to Haiti, and urged those in Haiti to leave, “due to the
volatile security situation.”  The Peace Corps withdrew its volunteers from Haiti in
June.  On November 22 the U.S. State Department modified its travel warning,
allowing non-emergency personnel and adult dependents to return to Haiti. The travel
warning remains in effect for other citizens.  The State Department further says that
both visitors and residents “must remain vigilant due to the absence of an effective
police force in much of Haiti.”  The warning notes that national elections “may
become a stimulus for further social tension, which could include violence.”39  
U.S. Arms Transfers and Sales to Haiti
In April 2005, the State Department notified Congress that it wanted to permit
U.S. companies to sell the interim Haitian government $1.9 million worth of arms,
including 3,000 .38-caliber revolvers for the Haitian National Police (HNP).  The
United States has had an arms embargo in place against Haiti since military forces
ousted President Aristide in 1991.  The policy allows exceptions to be considered on
a case-by-case basis, however.  Haiti remains listed in the International Trafficking
in Arms Regulations [22 CFR Part 126.1], which prohibit licenses for exports of
defense articles to certain countries.  The President may remove a country from the
list by issuing new regulations and notifying Congress, though this has not been done
regarding Haiti. The Administration and Congress concluded negotiations to address
congressional concerns in the letter of notification that allowed the arms sales
licensing to proceed.  According to State Department officials, it contains provisions
for the continued monitoring of the weapons, to address concerns about human rights
abuses by the HNP.  The arms — including the above-mentioned revolvers, 500 9mm
pistols, 500 12-gauge shotguns, 200 Mini-14 rifles, and 100 M4 carbines — had been
delivered to the HNP by the end of November but had not been distributed pending
weapons registration and police training.
The Administration also transferred excess U.S. law enforcement weapons to
the HNP in August 2004.  Some 2,600 handguns and 21 long guns were issued to
police academy graduating classes and to HNP field units following firearms and
human rights training.
The FY2006 foreign operations appropriations act (P.L. 109-102) would
prohibit any International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds from being
used to transfer excess weapons, ammunition, or other lethal property of a U.S.
agency to the government of Haiti for use by the Haitian National Police until the
Secretary of State certified to the Committees on Appropriations that the United
Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the interim Haitian government  had
carried out certain reforms for the Haitian National Police and the judicial system as
called for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1608 adopted on June 22,
2005.  The bill’s conference report also expresses concern about members of the
Haitian National Police or other individuals unlawfully using weapons, ammunition,
and other lethal materiel that has been provided or sold by the U.S. government and
therefore requires certain certification, and State Department reports, including
information on whether any United States-supplied or provided weapon or
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ammunition was used during human rights violations, and assessing steps taken by
the Haitian Transitional Government and MINUSTAH to provide adequate security
conditions for free and fair elections and to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate
armed groups. (For details, see “Legislation in the 109th Congress” below.)
Narcotics Trafficking
Haiti is a “key conduit” for cocaine being transported from South America to
the United States, and to a lesser degree, to Canada and Europe, according to the
State Department’s March 2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.
Several factors make Haiti attractive to narcotics traffickers.  Located between South
America and the United States, its coasts and border with the Dominican Republic
are largely uncontrolled.  Haiti’s nascent democratic institutions and ineffectual
infrastructure have been further weakened by the political impasse that has
characterized the country since 1997.  Haiti’s current legal system is antiquated, and,
according to the State Department, dysfunctional.  Haitian authorities charged with
controlling drug trafficking are inexperienced, lack sufficient resources, and, because
of Haiti’s extreme poverty, are considered highly susceptible to corruption. 
During Aristide’s term in office, in 2001, 2002, and 2003, the Bush
Administration said Haiti was not certified as having fully cooperated, or had “failed
demonstrably” to comply  with U.S. drug-control efforts. According to the Bush
Administration, the Aristide government took several important actions in 2002 and
2003, including putting into force a bilateral maritime narcotics interdiction
agreement with the United States, establishing a financial intelligence unit, and
extraditing four well-known traffickers to the United States.  It also said, however,
that “Haitian drug trafficking organizations continue to operate with relative
impunity.”  According to the State Department’s March 2004 report, “Serious
allegations persisted that high-level government and police officials [were] involved
in drug trafficking.”  There are numerous allegations that former President Aristide
was involved in drug trafficking.
All three years President Bush determined, however, that it was in the national
interest to continue providing aid to Haiti despite its counter narcotics performance
and granted a waiver so that aid to Haiti could continue. The Administration said that
“Haitian poverty and hopelessness” were chief catalysts in Haitian involvement in
the drug trade and in illegal migration to the United States.  Cutting off aid to Haiti,
including programs aimed at attacking those catalysts, “would aggravate an already
bad situation.”
In September 2004 and 2005, President Bush determined that Haiti remained a
major drug transit country.  In his annual determinations, he found that the interim
government took “substantive — if limited — counternarcotics actions....” in 2004,
and tried to improve its performance in 2005.  The Administration added, however,
that it remained “deeply concerned” about the Haitian government’s inability to carry
out sustained counternarcotics efforts.40
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Haitian Migration
The main elements of current immigration policy regarding Haitians are migrant
interdiction on the high seas and mandatory detentions of undocumented, interdicted
Haitians.  Since 1981, it has been U.S. policy to have the  U.S. Coast Guard stop and
search Haitian vessels on the high sea that are suspected of transporting
undocumented Haitians.  Some of the congressional debate over the years has
focused on whether interdicted Haitians are economic migrants, and should therefore
be returned to Haiti, or whether they are refugees with a well-founded fear of
persecution who should be allowed to stay in the United States while applying for
political asylum.  Some Members and human rights advocates express concern that
Haitians are not given the same treatment as other aliens seeking asylum in the
United States.  President Bush has said that Haitian “refugees” interdicted at sea will
be returned to Haiti.41
Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a ruling in April 2003 that
unauthorized Haitian migrants can be detained indefinitely in response to national
security concerns.42  The Administration said the ruling was needed to discourage
mass migration from Haiti and to prevent the U.S. Coast Guard and other Department
of Homeland Security agencies from being diverted from more important border
security priorities. The Attorney General further warned that terrorists may pose as
Haitian asylum seekers, a charge disputed by immigrant advocates and some U.S.
consular officials.  So far there have been no significant population movements, but
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has worked with Caribbean
states to set up contingency plans in the event of a mass exodus from Haiti.
Following the natural disasters of fall 2004,which killed almost 2,000 people
and left over 200,000 homeless, the Haitian government formally requested
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians in October of that year.  That status
would halt the deportation back to Haiti of thousands of undocumented Haitians
living in the United States.  Immigration advocates cited the precedent of Central
Americans being granted TPS following Hurricane Mitch in 1998.  A bill (H.R.
2592) that would make Haitians eligible for TPS was introduced in Congress in May
2005.  The Department of Homeland Security says it has not made a recommendation
at this time, but is continuing to monitor events in Haiti.  (For more information see
CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants; and CRS
Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and
Issues, both by Ruth Ellen Wasem.)
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Humanitarian Factors
Between February 2004 and October 2004, Haiti was faced with a series of
crises, including a civil conflict and the impact of several flood disasters and tropical
storms that resulted in thousands of deaths and tens of thousands being displaced and
injured.  Thousands of homes were also damaged or destroyed, along with crop and
livestock losses, and flooding devastated communities.  In 2005, Hurricane Dennis
and Tropical Storm Alpha also caused sea surges, localized flooding, mudslides, and
heavy rains in Haiti.
Haiti remains the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere.  Each natural
disaster was made worse in its cumulative effect not only because of Haiti’s extreme
poverty but also because of its vulnerability to floods and mudslides as a result of
severe environmental degradation.  The ongoing political crisis in Haiti and the poor
conditions, which include food insecurity and a lack of basic health care and
sanitation, are of great concern.  The U.S. and international community have
responded to these situations as they unfolded with disaster relief and recovery
assistance.  
In 2004, with an ongoing lack of security, assessments of the humanitarian
situation remained fluid.  Lack of road security, looting, and poor road conditions at
times impeded the delivery of aid.  With the assistance of MINUSTAH, the
conditions have reportedly seen improvement and are now more consistently
sustained, though the situation remains precarious.  The international effort is
meeting with some success in building health networks and providing food
assistance, but much more is needed to provide sustained shelter, food security, and
adequate health care.  Experts are also concerned about the plight of refugees in the
Dominican Republic and whether they are receiving adequate humanitarian
assistance and protection.
International humanitarian actors continue field operations in Haiti and include
MINUSTAH, U.N. agencies, international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and bilateral and multilateral donors.  The United Nations Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is in close contact with the
U.N. Resident Coordinator on the ground to facilitate relief efforts. 
USAID has provided assistance for disaster relief and humanitarian needs.
Congress approved $100 million in emergency assistance for Caribbean countries
affected by the 2004 natural disasters, including Haiti.  The aid was incorporated into
the FY2005 Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-324).  Some Members criticized the
level of aid as too small considering the amount of damage wrought by the storms.
The United States and other bilateral and multilateral donors are providing ongoing
humanitarian assistance through the donor strategy plan endorsed at the International
Donors Conference on Haiti in July 2004.  The plan extends through September
2006.  Donors are helping the interim government develop the foundation for a long-
term Poverty Reduction Strategy to be further developed and implemented by the
next government.
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Legislation in the 109th Congress
P.L. 109-13 (H.R. 1268).  Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2005. Makes $20 million in Economic Support Funds available for
Haiti, of which $2.5 million should be made available for criminal case management,
case tracking, and the reduction of pre-trial detention in Haiti, notwithstanding any
other provision of law.  Introduced March 11, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-72), signed into law
May 11, 2005.
P.L. 109-53 (H.R. 3045/S. 1307).  Dominican Republic-Central
America-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act.  Contains a side
letter indicating the Administration’s intent to work with Congress to allow benefits
available under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act for articles co-produced
by Haiti and the Dominican Republic to continue once CAFTA is implemented.
Introduced June 23, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-182); passed Senate 54-45 June 30; signed
into law August 2, 2005.
P.L. 109-95 (H.R. 1409).  Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to
provide assistance for orphans and other vulnerable children in developing countries,
and for other purposes.  Introduced, referred to House Committee on International
Relations March 17, 2005.  Became public law November 8, 2005.
P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057).  Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006.  International Military Education and
Training funds and Foreign Military Financing may only be provided to Haiti through
the regular notification procedures.  Section 549 makes available for Haiti (1) $20
million from Child Survival and Health Programs Fund; (2) $30 million from
Development Assistance; (3) $50 million from Economic Support Fund; (4) $15
million from International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; (5) $1 million
from Foreign Military Financing Program; and (6) $215,000 from International
Military Education and Training.  It also continues to allow the government of Haiti
to purchase defense articles and services under the Arms Export Control Act for the
Coast Guard.  Section 549 (c) prohibits any ‘International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement’ funds from being used to transfer excess weapons, ammunition, or
other lethal property of an agency of the United States government to the government
of Haiti for use by the Haitian National Police until the Secretary of State certifies to
the Committees on Appropriations that (1) the United Nations Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) has carried out the vetting of the senior levels of the Haitian National
Police and has ensured that those credibly alleged to have committed serious crimes,
including drug trafficking and human rights violations, have been suspended; and (2)
the Transitional Haitian National Government is cooperating in a reform and
restructuring plan for the Haitian National Police and the reform of the judicial
system as called for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1608 adopted on
June 22, 2005.  Introduced June 24, 2005, referred to House and Senate Committees
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on Appropriations (H.Rept. 109-152; S.Rept. 109-96).  Became public law
November 14, 2005.
The conference report expresses concern about members of the Haitian National
Police or other individuals unlawfully using weapons, ammunition, and other lethal
materiel that has been provided or sold by the United States Government and
therefore requires the certification included in Section 549(c).  The conferees
understand that investigations into extrajudicial killings and other alleged incidents
of human rights abuses by the police are currently underway but are severely limited
by the lack of investigative capacity within the HNP. The conferees request that not
later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this act, the State Department report
to the appropriate congressional committees the findings of these investigations,
including information on whether any United States-supplied or provided weapon or
ammunition was used during those incidents.  Directs the Secretary of State to submit
a report to the Committees on Appropriations within 30 days of enactment of the act
which (1) describes in detail the steps taken by the Haitian Transitional Government
and the United Nations Stabilization Mission to provide adequate security to permit
free and fair elections with broad based participation by all political parties, and to
demobilize, disarm and reintegrate armed groups, and (2) provides an assessment of
the effectiveness of such steps.  Conference report (H.Rept. 109-265) agreed to in
House 358-39, November 4, 2005.
H.R. 257 (Jackson-Lee).  To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to
reunify families, permit earned access to permanent resident status, provide
protection against unfair immigration-related employment practices, reform the
diversity visa program, provide adjustment of status for Haitians and Liberian
nationals, and for other purposes.  Introduced January 6, 2005, referred to House
Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims March 2.
H.R. 611 (Foley).  To authorize the establishment of a program to provide
economic and infrastructure reconstruction assistance to the Republic of Haiti, and
for other purposes.  Introduced and  referred to the House Committee on International
Relations February 8, 2005.  Forwarded by subcommittee to full committee
(amended) by 7-6 vote.
H.R. 899 (Cardin).  To amend section 402 of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 to provide a two-year extension of
supplemental security income in fiscal years 2006 through 2008 for refugees, asylees,
and certain other humanitarian immigrants.  Introduced February17, 2005, referred
to House Ways and Means Committee’s Subcommittee on Human Resources
March 3.
H.R. 945 (Lee).  To provide assistance to combat infectious diseases in Haiti
and to establish a comprehensive health infrastructure in Haiti, and for other
purposes.  Introduced, referred to House Committee on International Relations
February 17, 2005.  Referred to Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere March
17, 2005.
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H.R. 946 (Lee).  To establish the Independent Commission on the 2004 Coup
d’Etat in the Republic of Haiti.  Introduced, referred to House Committee on
International Relations February 17, 2005.  Referred to Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere March 17, 2005.
H.R. 1130 (Waters).  To provide for the cancellation of debts owed to
international financial institutions by poor countries, and for other purposes.
Introduced March 3, 2005, referred to House Financial Services Committee’s
Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and
Technology March 28.
H.R. 1213 (Hyde)/S. 704 (Martinez).  To authorize appropriations for FY2006
for voluntary contributions on a grant basis to the Organization of American States
(OAS) to establish a Center for Caribbean Basin Trade and to establish a skills-based
training program for Caribbean Basin countries.  H.R. 1213 introduced, referred to
House Committee on International Relations March 10; Senate version introduced,
referred to Committee on Foreign Relations April 5, 2005.
H.R. 1737 (Meek).  To amend the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act
of 1998 to benefit individuals who were children when such Act was enacted.
Introduced April 20, 2005, referred to House Judiciary Committee’s subcommittee
on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims May 10.
H.R. 2092 (Jackson-Lee).  Save America Comprehensive Immigration Act of
2005, introduced May 4, 2005.  Referred to House Committees on Judiciary; Ways
and Means; Energy and Commerce; Agriculture; Homeland Security; Financial
Services; to Subcommittee on Health, for a period to be subsequently determined by
the Chairman, May 23, 2005.
H.R. 2592 (Hastings).  Haiti Compassion Act, to designate Haiti under section
244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to render nationals of Haiti
eligible for temporary protected status under such section.  Introduced, referred to
House Committee on Judiciary May 24, 2005.
 
H.R. 2601(Smith, Christopher).  Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 2006 and 2007, Introduced May 24, 2005, House International Relations
Committee Report 109-168.  Requires the Secretary of State to submit a report on all
United States weapons transfers, sales, and licensing to the Government of the
Republic of Haiti from October 4, 1991 through the date of enactment of this act, not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment.  Also requires, not later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this act and one year thereafter, a report on
U.S. efforts to (1) assist in the disarmament of illegally armed forces in Haiti,
including through a program of gun exchanges; (2) assist in the reform of the Haitian
National Police; and (3) support stabilization in Haiti.  Received in the Senate July
22, 2005, read twice, placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
Calendar No. 172.
 
H.R. 2862 (Wolf).  Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006.  Introduced June 10, 2005, referred to
House and Senate Appropriations Committees; H.Rept. 109-118; S.Rept. 109-88.
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Conference committee actions.  Both versions provide that an amount not to exceed
$20,000,000 shall remain available until expended to make payments in advance for
grants, contracts and reimbursable agreements, and other expenses authorized by
section 501(c) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, for the care and
security in the United States of Haitian (and Cuban) entrants.  Conference held
November 3, conferees agreed to file conference report November4, 2005.
H.R. 3658 ( Meek).  Amends the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of
1998 (HRIFA) to (1) include document fraud among the grounds of inadmissibility
which shall not preclude an otherwise qualifying Haitian alien from permanent
resident status adjustment; and (2) provide that determinations with respect to
children shall be made using the age of an individual as of the date of enactment of
this act. Permits new status adjustment applications to be filed for a limited time
period. Directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish procedures for
reopening status adjustment applications based upon the amendments made by this
act.  Introduced September 6, 2005, referred to House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims September 19, 2005.
 
H.R. 3700 (Tancredo).  Reducing Immigration to a Genuinely Healthy Total
(RIGHT) Act of 2005.  Introduced, referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary
September 8, 2005.
H.R. 4211 (Meek)/S. 1937(DeWine).  Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity
Act.  Amends the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act to expand certain
preferential trade treatment for Haiti if the President certifies to Congress that Haiti
has fulfilled certain requirements, including that Haiti “has established or is making
continual progress toward establishing” a market-based economy that “minimizes
government interference in the economy...”; the rule of law; elimination of barriers
to U.S. trade and investment; economic policies to reduce poverty and achieve other
goals; a system to combat corruption; protection of internationally recognized worker
rights; and that Haiti does not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national
security or foreign policy interests; and does not engage in gross violations of human
rights or support acts of international terrorism, and cooperates in international
efforts to eliminate them.  Introduced in Senate, referred to Committee on Finance
October 27, 2005.  Introduced in House, referred to Committee on Ways and Means
November 2, 2005.
S. 350 (Lugar).  To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide
assistance for orphans and other vulnerable children in developing countries, and for
other purposes.  Introduced, referred to Committee on Foreign Relations February 10,
2005.
 
S. 453 (Smith).  Amends the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 to provide for an extension of eligibility for supplemental
security income through FY2008 for refugees, asylees, and certain other humanitarian
immigrants, applies to some Haitian (and Cuban) entrants.  Introduced,  referred to
Committee on Finance February 17, 2005.
S. 600 (Lugar).  To authorize appropriations for the Department of State and
international broadcasting activities, the Peace Corps, and foreign assistance
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programs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and for other purposes.  Would allow Haiti
to purchase defense articles for the Haitian Coast Guard, would make “not less than”
$163 million in assistance available to Haiti for FY2006.  Makes the finding that
“The situation in Haiti is increasingly cause for alarm and concern, and a sustained,
coherent, and active approach” by the U.S. government is needed, and would require
not later than 60 days after enactment a report describing U.S. policy toward Haiti
with specific elements detailed.  Introduced March 10, 2005, referred to Foreign
Relations Committee.  (S.Rept. 109-35), Senate floor actions April 26, returned to
the Calendar. Calendar No. 48.
S. 1197 (Biden).  Violence Against Women Act of 2005, provides for aliens or
children of aliens who qualify for relief under the Haitian Refugee Immigration
Fairness Act of 1998 to petition for certain protections of battered and trafficked
immigrants.  Introduced June 8, 2005, passed Senate with amendment by unanimous
consent October 4; received in House, held at the desk October 6, 2005.
Legislation in the 108th Congress
The following list includes legislation  that was approved and become public
law during the 108th Congress.  For the status of other legislation at the end of the
108th, see the CRS online guide, Haiti: Legislation in the 108th Congress, by Andy
Mendelson at [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/officialsources/haitileg.shtml].
P.L. 108-7 (H.J.Res. 2).  Consolidated Appropriations for FY2003.  The
Commerce, Justice and State appropriations bill makes available, in the “Federal
Prison” section, an amount “not to exceed” $20 million of contract confinement
funds for the care and security in the U.S. of Haitian (and Cuban) entrants.  Under the
Foreign Operations appropriations (Division E), Section 551 a) allows the Haitian
government to purchase defense articles and services for the Coast Guard.  Section
551 b) provides that “not less than” $52.5 million of funds appropriated by Title II
and to carry out AID  food aid programs  should be allocated for Haiti.  Signed into
law February 20, 2003.
P.L. 108-25 (H.R. 1298/S. 1009).  The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003.  Haiti is among 13 countries (Guyana and 12
African countries) that the legislation expressly  benefits, with an HIV/AIDS
Coordinator in charge of approving all U.S. activities (funding included) aimed at
combating AIDS in these countries (Section 102 (a)).  Appropriates $3 billion per
year through FY2008 for bilateral and multilateral efforts to combat HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria.  Signed into law May 27, 2003.
P.L. 108-199 (H.R. 2673).  Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2004
(H.R. 2800/S. 1426), incorporated into consolidated  appropriations act.  The
Commerce, Justice and State appropriations act makes available until expended, in
the “Federal Prison System” section, an amount “not to exceed” $20 million of
confinement funds for the care and security in the U.S. of Haitian (and Cuban)
entrants.  Under the Foreign Operations appropriations (Division D), Section 551
allows the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and services for the Coast
Guard.  Sec. 567(b) makes $34 million available for family planning, maternal, and
reproductive health activities in 12 countries, including Haiti.  Section 616 prohibits
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the use of funds to issue a visa to any alien involved in extrajudicial and political
killings in Haiti, including exemption and reporting requirements.  Allocates $5
million to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti. Allocates $19 million in Refugee and
Entrant Assistance funds to communities with large concentrations of Haitian (and
Cuban) refugees of varying ages whose cultural differences make assimilation
especially difficult, justifying a more intense level and longer duration of federal
assistance for health care and education.  Conference agreement for omnibus vehicle
approved by House December 8, 2003, and by Senate January 22, 2004.  Signed into
law January 23, 2004.
P.L. 108-324 (H.R. 4837).  The FY2005 Military Construction Appropriations
and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act includes $100 million
in emergency assistance for Caribbean countries affected by the recent natural
disasters, including Haiti.  According to the supplemental budget requests from the
Bush Administration that the bill fulfills, the aid will support the temporary provision
of electricity; housing rehabilitation and reconstruction; agriculture sector
reconstruction; water and sanitation systems reconstruction; and the rehabilitation of
rural infrastructure such as roads, schools, and health facilities.
P.L. 108-447 (H.R. 4818).  The FY2005 consolidated appropriations act
contains several provisions regarding Haiti.  The law (1) makes International Military
Education and Training funds and Foreign Military Financing available only through
regular notification procedures; (2) appropriates $20 million for child survival and
health programs, $25 million for development assistance, including agriculture,
environment, and basic education programs; $40 million in ESF for judicial reform,
police training, and national elections; “sufficient funds” for the OAS to help Haiti
hold elections in 2005 and $2 million to Zanmi Lasante for maternal and child health
activities; (3) allows Haiti to purchase defense articles and services for its Coast
Guard; (4) notes disappointment on the Haitian government’s role in the trial and
acquittal of Louis Jodel Chamblain and the deteriorating security human rights
situation; (5) requires a report within 90 days on a multi-year assistance strategy; (6)
and encourages the Administration to help Haitian and NGO officials to devise a
reforestation strategy and to provide a report on that strategy within 180 days.  The
conference report was agreed to in both houses on November 20.  Signed into law
December 8, 2004.  The earlier Senate version had made several findings regarding
improving security in Haiti, concluding that “the failure to establish a secure and
stable environment and to conduct credible and inclusive elections will likely result
in Haiti’s complete transition from a failed state to a criminal state.”
